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ABSTRACT: Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of 
artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I 
call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an 
empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content-related views of aesthetic 
experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter 
with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that 
realize its purpose. Attention to these properties make percipients better able to spot them in 
other entities and scenes as well. The upshot is that an aesthetic commerce with artworks 
enlarges the scope of what we are able to see and has therefore momentous epistemic 
consequences.  
 
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of perception; Aesthetic properties; Everyday aesthetics; Aesthetic 
experience; Exemplification; Scaffolding.  
 
 
 [the artist] disturbs, upsets, enlightens, and he opens ways for a better understanding. Whereas those who 
are not artists are trying to close the book, he opens it, shows there are still more pages possible 
Henri Robert, The Art Spirit (1923/2007, p. 11) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is sometimes claimed that one way to come to contemplate aesthetically 
quotidian things and scenes is through the arts (e.g. Goodman 1984, p. 85; Nanay 
2018; Schwartz 1985). For instance, Leddy (2013, p. 96, p. 114) suggests that 
appreciating arts like painting and photography may foster our capacity to 
experience even junkyards or roadside clutter aesthetically (Leddy 2008). Indeed, 
many artists and art historians have drawn attention to the fact that, sometimes at 
least, contemplating artworks aesthetically bears on our perception of the world. 
Proust (1913/1922, p. 311) recounts of how Swann fell in love with Odette after 
noticing her resemblance to Botticelli’s representation of Zipporah in the Sistine 
chapel. Gombrich suggests that a proper commerce with artworks may disclose to 
our eyes the beauties hidden in our everyday (1950/2018, p. 59) (cf. also Wilde 
1889/2010). Call this Art-to-World (AtW)1.  
I shall investigate AtW focusing mainly on visually-accessible artworks 
(paintings, etc.). We can formulate AtW as follows:  
	
1	By “world” I understand basically any kind of things, scenes, or events, 
including people or other artworks.  
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AtW: In virtue of having looked at an artwork aesthetically, a subject may 
come to look aesthetically at other things and scenes as well.   
It remains to be seen exactly what it means to look at something aesthetically (call 
this “Aesthetic Looking”), and explain how artworks may affect our perception of 
the world (call this “Aesthetic Alteration”).2 
I will argue that Aesthetic Alteration is accounted for by means of exemplification 
(Goodman 1976, pp. 52ff, 1984, pp. 54ff; Elgin 1996, p. 17; 2017, pp. 183ff). 
Artworks embody certain features in a way that makes us better aware of their 
instantiations in other contexts, including other artworks and our quotidian lives. 
In this paper I will significantly reinforce and expand this claim by combining it 
with a content-related account of aesthetic experience (“Aesthetic Looking”), i.e. 
the claim that an experience counts as aesthetic only if it involves attending with 
understanding to aesthetic, expressive, and design properties (Carroll 2000, p. 
207; Saito 2007, p. 9). Furthermore, I acknowledge one important lesson taught by 
proponents of everyday aesthetics, namely that the palette of aesthetic properties 
is far broader than what has been acknowledged by more conservative 
approaches (Leddy 1995, 2013; Light & Smith 2005; Saito 2007, 2017)3. This 
combination of views will allow me to maintain that attending to artworks 
aesthetically magnifies not only our capacity to spot elsewhere the features 
exemplified, but also those properties in the artworks — those aesthetic, 
expressive, and design properties, broadly construed — that ground the 
exemplification by scaffolding the percipient’s perceptual flow (Sterelny 2010).  
	
2 A reviewer has rightly pointed out to me that it seems thoroughly possible to 
enjoy the reverse experience, call this World-to-Art (WtA), or even a World-to-
World (WtW) aesthetic experience. I do not deny such possibilities. However, as 
my account will make clear, their similarity with AtW is only superficial. In the 
latter case we are talking about an effect achieved artificially through the artists’ 
skillful construction of their works. 
3	Proponents of everyday aesthetics urge that the role and degree of immersion of 
the subject in aesthetic experiences is much more variegated than more traditional 
approaches assume, e.g. sensorily immersive experiences or even engagement-
related aesthetic experiences (Gumbrecht 2006; Saito 2007, 2017). Most of my 
examples will be taken from a “spectator-like” standpoint (focusing on vision), 
but my account might easily be generalized to other experiences as well.	
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The claim that artworks thus enable us to notice features we did not notice before 
in our surroundings has several important implications. Firstly, it is of epistemic 
significance, as it leads to enlarge a subject’s perceptual uptake of the world. 
Secondly, everyday aestheticians urge that aesthetic properties have a 
considerable social, environmental, and moral power, both positive and negative 
(Mandoki 2007), that has been hitherto underappreciated in analytic philosophy 
(cf. Berleant 2010; Irvin 2008; Saito 2017, pp. 196ff). Coming to notice aesthetic, 
expressive, and design properties in our world may represent one way to make 
«our lives […] more satisfying to us, even more profound» (Irvin 2008, p. 41).    
A challenge to my view, however, is represented by an alternative, recent account 
of AtW put forth by Nanay (2018). Nanay defends the following views regarding 
Aesthetic Looking and Aesthetic Alteration, call them, respectively, N1 and N2:  
(N1) In contrast to content-related views of aesthetic experience, Aesthetic 
Looking is due to a distinctive pattern of attention called aesthetic attention 
(Nanay 2018, p. 77).   
(N2) Aesthetic Alteration is due to the lingering of aesthetic attention 
(Nanay 2018, p. 79).  
Clearly, N1 and N2 stand in sharp contrast with the view outlined above. A 
dialectic engagement with Nanay’s account offers me the opportunity to bolster 
my own view and show its superiority over Nanay’s account on both conceptual 
and empirical grounds. 
I zoom in on Nanay’s challenge and defend my content-related account of 
Aesthetic Looking in the first part of the paper (§§2-3); I turn to Aesthetic 
Alteration, in the second part (§4). 
2. NANAY ON ATTENTION AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE 
2.1  THE CONTENT VIEW  
Nanay (2018) uses AtW as a foil to assess theories of aesthetic experience.  
We can cluster theories of aesthetic experience in two groups4. The two groups 
disagree about the signature of the aesthetic, i.e. the necessary condition that 
	
4 Nanay (2018, pp. 76-77) singles out also a third group, that of theories that 
identify a two-fold signature of the aesthetic, the content and some reaction 
towards it. For instance, on Levinson’s (2016) view in order to have an aesthetic 
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makes an experience aesthetic. The first group is that of the content-related views. 
These theories agree that aesthetic experience has its signature in a specific type of 
experiential content, though they diverge about what further (sufficient) 
conditions must be met (cf. Carroll 2012, p. 175). The second group is that of 
structural views. According to this family of views, the signature of the aesthetic is 
not the content, but a peculiar structure of experience (e.g. Dewey 1934).  
Nanay’s strategy is a disjunctive argument, he puts pressure on content-related 
views and then shows how is structural approach does not suffer the same 
shortcomings. Since his criticism of content-related views provides the basis for 
his own account of Aesthetic Looking (N1), we will first have to briefly elaborate 
on content-related views in order to assay Nanay’s arguments. I zoom in on 
Carroll’s account for two reasons: first, because it is explicitly targeted by Nanay 
(2018, p. 76); and second, because it is a minimal or “narrow” (Goldman 2013) 
approach that virtually every proponent of content-related views can accept, 
although some add further conditions for having an aesthetic experience, such as 
having evaluative responses (Beardsley 1969; Levinson 2016). 
Carroll maintains that, in so far as every experience has content, aesthetic 
experiences exhibit a particular type of content: 
An aesthetic experience is one that involves design appreciation and/or the 
detection of aesthetic and expressive properties, and/or attention to the 
ways in which the formal, aesthetic and expressive properties of the 
artwork are contrived. (Carroll 2000, p. 207; cf. also 2001, p. 60).  
…an aesthetic experience of a work of art is a matter of attending with 
understanding to the formal and/or the aesthetic and/or the expressive 
properties of a work of art. (Carroll 2012, p. 173). 
(cf. also 1999, pp. 156ff; 2000; 2001; 2010, pp. 77ff.; 2012; 2015). Carrol neither 
specifies the nature of content nor of experience: it can be flexibly understood as 
either perceptual (seeing, hearing, etc.) or cognitive (remembering, thinking, etc.) 
	
experience, a subject needs to direct attention to certain content and have an 
evaluative response (e.g. an emotional reaction). Hence, content apprehension per 
se is not sufficient for enjoying an aesthetic experience, as that content must 
produce an evaluative reaction. Since content is still a necessary ingredient of 
aesthetic experiences, we can subsume this group under the content-related views 
(more on this below).  
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content. The content of an aesthetic experience must disjunctively feature aesthetic, 
expressive, or design (formal) properties (AED-properties for short). Expressive 
properties refer to emotional states, as when we characterize Chopin’s funeral 
march as “sad” (Argenton 2008; Noordhof 2008). Aesthetic properties, like 
beautiful, graceful, tragic, etc. together with expressive properties, mark the 
«intensity» of an artwork (Carroll’s term), whereas formal or design properties 
include properties such as unity, complexity, balance, composition, etc. (Carroll 
2015; Beardsley 1981); such properties are the «ensemble of choices elected to 
realize the point or the purpose of the artwork» (Carroll 2012, p. 173) 5.  
Carroll mainly focuses on artworks — though he maintains that his account 
applies to aesthetic experience of nature as well 6 — and artworks are 
fundamentally realized or embodied by means of these properties. He maintains 
(2015) that artworks are embodied purposes, and AED-properties are the ways in 
which purposes are embodied (§5.1) (cf. also Goodman 1976, p. 256; Hegel 1835-
1838/2017). To attend to such properties means to attend to how «the work 
works» (Carroll 2001, p. 59). 
On Carroll’s account, content is not enough to enjoy an aesthetic experience, for a 
subject may stand in front of an artwork replete with such properties and yet fail 
to notice them. In order to have an aesthetic experience, Carroll requires the 
subject to attend with understanding (informed attention) to AED-properties (1999, p. 
203; 2010, p. 101; 2015, p. 172). The requirement that attention must be informed 
mandates that content must be negotiated in terms of «certain strategies and 
techniques of reception» (2010, p. 104) that are specific to the category the artwork 
belongs to.  
2.2  NANAY’S CRITICISM OF THE CONTENT VIEW 
Nanay formulates three challenges against content-related views.  
	
5 As Carroll points out, expressive and design properties can be both regarded as 
aesthetic properties, broadly understood.  
6 He maintains (2015, p. 175) that in spite of their lack of explicit purpose, natural 
scenes might be said to instantiate formal properties in virtue of our heuristic 
attribution of purposes to Nature. Notice that nothing in my argument depends 
on this claim.    
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The first challenge is framed as a conditional: if AED-properties are construed too 
narrowly it might be difficult to explain the «entire phenomenon of the aesthetic 
experience of everyday» (2018, p. 78). Call this “Conservatism:”    
CONSERVATISM: If we construe AED-properties too narrowly, then it would 
be difficult to explain the aesthetic experience of the world.   
How should we interpret this challenge? One way of doing so, for example, is to 
espouse a view on which the only aesthetically relevant property is the beautiful 
(Danto 2007). With this conception in place, it would be difficult to explain AtW 
on two grounds: first, because “beauty” does not seem an apposite predicate for 
much of the contemporary artistic production; and second, because “beauty” 
seems too strong a predicate for many aesthetic experiences of the world (§3.1). 
The second challenge is “Different Properties:” 
DIFFERENT PROPERTIES: Suppose that at t1 a subject aesthetically experiences 
an artwork X. At t2, she aesthetically experiences the everyday Y in virtue 
of having looked at X aesthetically (AtW), but X and Y have different 
properties (Nanay 2018, pp. 78-79). 
The challenge for content-related views would go as follows: If X and Y have 
different properties it is not clear how one can enjoy an aesthetic experience of 
artworks and, subsequently, an aesthetic experience of the everyday, given that 
the two experiences will not share the same content. Of course, it would be trivial 
to claim that X and Y possess different properties qua numerically distinct entities; 
instead, X and Y should differ in their relevant properties, properties that type an 
experience as an aesthetic one, i.e. AED-properties.  
Finally, “No-Property-Change:” 
NO-PROPERTY-CHANGE: Suppose that at t1 a subject experiences an 
everyday object Y. At t2, she experiences an artwork X aesthetically, and at 
t3, she experiences again the very same Y aesthetically (AtW), and none of 
Y’s relevant properties have changed between t1 and t3 (Nanay 2018, p. 79).  
This scenario poses two different challenges for content-related views. First, it is 
not clear on such views why the subject did not have any experiential uptake of 
Y’s AED-properties at t1, but only at t3. Second, and relatedly, it is not clear what 
role does X play in eliciting the subject’s aesthetic experience of Y at t3. 
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2.3 AESTHETIC ATTENTION  
Taking stock of the three challenges, Nanay claims that the signature of aesthetic 
experience is not content, but a peculiar experiential structure:  
(N1) Aesthetic looking is due to aesthetic attention, i.e. the subject’s attention 
is object-focused and property-distributed (Nanay 2018, p. 77). 
Notice that N1 is target-neutral, we may thus look at an artwork, an everyday 
item, a face, or scenario through the lens of aesthetic attention. On behalf of 
Nanay, it is fair to say that he thinks only certain kinds of aesthetic experiences are 
captured by what he calls aesthetic attention (2015d) (§3.1).  
The rationale of this view lies in specific and empirically substantiated claims 
about the nature of attention. It is a well-known fact in cognitive science that the 
limited amount of time and cognitive resources (e.g. Chun et al. 2011; Franconeri 
et al. 2013) force the subject’s cognitive system to organize and prioritize the 
information gathered from the environment. The allocation of cognitive resources 
is a peculiar task of attention, which can bring into sharper focus only part of the 
visual scene, feature, or object (focused, or focal attention), with a highly 
determinate content, or it can be less determinate but more broadly distributed to 
different items (distributed or diffuse attention) (Nanay 2010, p. 22; Erikson & 
Hoffman 1972). Attention can also be object-directed — as when we allocate our 
resources to a specific visual object or scene — or property-directed — as when 
we allocate our resources to a specific property of the targets (e.g. Dretske 2010; 
Nanay 2010) 7 . What Nanay calls “aesthetic attention” is an attentional 
configuration that is at once object-focused and property-distributed. This is 
supposed to shed light on many instances of aesthetic experience (cf. Nanay 
2015a, pp. 27-28). 
An important step in Nanay’s dialectic is that the view would be empirically 
supported by studies on oculomotor correlates of art perception, and in particular 
by Vogt & Magnussen (2007) (§3.1). Vogt & Magnussen have examined and 
compared the oculomotor activities of experts and laymen in front of 16 pictures 
of increasing abstractness. It was found that experts seem to fixate less on familiar 
objects — such as faces, people, etc. — and tend to stay fixated less on the details 
than laymen. Furthermore, these studies have shown that experts’ looks covered 
	
7 For an account of visual objects, cf. Vernazzani (2021) 
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wider areas of the presented pictures. Nanay interprets these findings as 
suggesting that art experts tend to deploy an attention pattern that is object-
focused (the artwork), and property-distributed (scanning wider areas of the 
depicted surface). 
3. DEFENDING AESTHETIC CONTENT 
3.1  PROBLEMS WITH THE AESTHETIC ATTENTION 
Before revisiting Nanay’s three-challenges against content-related views, we must 
first highlight one crucial issue with N1.   
Structural views are usually thought to be vulnerable to the following objection: 
they provide criteria for aesthetic experience that are at once too restrictive and 
too liberal (e.g. Carroll 2001, pp. 49ff; Irvin 2008; Saito 2017). Too restrictive, for 
we might easily conceive a case in which the subject’s attention is, for instance, 
both object and property-focused. Rebecca is aesthetically mesmerized by the 
suffering expression of Christ in Grünewald’s Crucifixion from the Isenheim’s 
altarpiece, i.e. her attention is object focused (the painting) as well property-
focused (Christ’s expression). But N1 seems also too liberal. A robber points a 
knife at Rosalind’s chest, in her anguish she focuses on the knife, but her attention 
is property-distributed, she does not attend to any specific property of the 
weapon, but to many of them keeping track of every movement of the blade. This 
case complies with N1, but ascription of an aesthetic experience to Rosalind seems 
just downright implausible. But let us not jump too quickly to conclusions, there 
are two possible responses on behalf of N1.   
A trivial response is that, however counterintuitive it may seem, Rebecca is not 
really enjoying an aesthetic experience, while Rosalind is. This strategy calls into 
question the cogency of our intuitions, but even if we acknowledge that intuitions 
are not always good guides for doing philosophy, opting for this tack seems 
unjustifiably too revisionary. 
But there is a second response. Earlier, I hastened to add that Nanay’s account is 
not meant to provide a necessary condition for enjoying all sorts of aesthetic 
experience. The obvious assumption here is that aesthetic experiences are 
variegated and may have little in common, perhaps, not even aesthetic attention. 
Nanay emphasizes this when he cautiously suggests that aesthetic attention 
captures a few «telling instances» of aesthetic experience, like the following one 
described by Proust:  
Forth. in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences| DOI: 10.1007/s11097-021-09742-1 
	 9 
But even this ugliness of faces, which of course were mostly familiar to 
him, seemed something new now that their features—instead of being to 
him symbols of practical utility in the identification of this or that person 
who until then had represented merely so many pleasures to be pursued, 
boredoms to be avoided, or courtesies to be acknowledged—rested in the 
autonomy of their lines measurable by aesthetic co-ordinates alone. (Proust 
1913/1992, p. 448).  
It is not entirely clear to me what Nanay’s “telling instances” really are, but let us 
assume, as he suggests, that they are typed by the aesthetic attention pattern, i.e. 
object-focused and property-distributed. If Nanay purports to account for AtW in 
terms of aesthetic attention, it obviously follows that both aesthetic looking at the 
artwork and aesthetic looking at the everyday must be somehow subsumed 
under the same aesthetic-attention kind. However, Nanay’s remarks make room 
for aesthetic experiences that do not fit squarely within his own aesthetic 
attention account. This would allow him to concede that, perhaps, Rebecca’s 
experience is an aesthetic one, after all. Yet, if one makes such a move, one is 
implicitly suggesting that aesthetic attention may not be the aesthetic signature 
we were looking for. Clearly, it cannot be attention alone, for otherwise pretty 
much every experience would be an aesthetic one. In other words, we are back to 
the issue of finding the necessary hallmark, what I called the “signature,” that 
makes some experiences “aesthetic.” 
We can gain some fresh insights by reading again Proust’s quotation. Swann finds 
the faces new because he is paying attention to their aesthetic features for the first 
time, namely their ugliness (Nanay 2018, pp. 77-78). It is not that these properties 
did not fall under Swann’s visual field before, but he was not paying attention to 
them. Elaborating on his aesthetic attention account, Nanay (2015a, p. 29) refers to 
an illuminating example: suppose you experience aesthetically a Giacometti’s 
sculpture. You attention is focused on the object (the sculpture), and distributed 
to its properties. However, Nanay also adds that on this scenario the subject is 
«admiring [the sculpture’s] composition» (ivi, my emphasis). In other words, the 
subject is attentively focusing on the sculpture’s design or formal properties (§2.1). 
Now, suppose a burglar attacks you (Nanay’s example, again). You quickly scan 
the environment — pausing on the sculpture — looking for a defence weapon. 
Your attention changes configuration from object-distributed and property-
focused (aesthetic attention) to object-distributed and property-focused. Now you 
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look for objects with the right sort of property that may help you to defend 
against the assault. What makes this experience not an aesthetic one? Perhaps, the 
fact that in this case you are not attending to the target’s AED-properties trying to 
appreciate how the «work works», you focus on aesthetically irrelevant 
properties. So, here is my conjecture: the aesthetic signature can be identified in 
the way the percipient mobilizes her attentional resources so as to attentively look 
at the target’s AED-properties. This conjecture, I believe, finds considerable 
empirical support. 
Vogt & Magnussen’s results (2007) have been reproduced by a number of other 
studies. Pihko et al. (2011) have found that experts tend to deploy more global 
(rather than local) viewing strategies than non-experts (Zangmeister et al. 1995). 
This is expressed in the finding that «laypersons concentrate on the details of the 
picture, experts also examine the spatial construction while evaluating the 
esthetics of the painting» (Pihko et al. 2011, p. 8; Kapoula et al. 2008). Experts tend 
to attend to the pictures’ compositions that are usually not attended to by laymen. 
The scanpaths reveal that artists and art experts «view familiar objects to a lesser 
extent than the layman, with an increased preference for viewing more or less 
abstract, structural features instead» (Vogt & Magnussen 2007, p. 98; my 
emphasis). Francusz et al. (2018) have also found that in deploying more global 
strategies, experts tended to detect the pictures’ balance and structure, while 
laymen are more attracted to semantic objects such as faces and their 
expressiveness, people, and other narrative elements. This in turn is correlated 
with better, more accurate evaluations of the pictures, lending support to 
Nodine’s conjecture that «visual structure, attention and judgment of 
compositional design are intimately related» (1982, p. 52). As Vogt & Magnussen 
suggest, differences in oculomotor movements in experts and laymen mark their 
different viewing strategies, i.e. the fact that in virtue of their acquired capacities, 
experts mobilize their perceptual resources in a way different from laymen. The 
empirical studies converge thus in emphasizing the importance of structural 
features, of composition, in short: formal or design properties. 
We can extrapolate the following lesson: while artists and art experts attend to a 
greater degree to the pictures’ AED-properties, laymen tend to fixate and see 
more often familiar or ordinary items. As I will suggest (§3.3) the difference 
between laymen and experts is more one of degree, rather than of kind; but the 
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important point is that the alleged empirical evidence for the aesthetic attention 
view actually provides support for content-related views of aesthetic experiences.  
Having shifted the balance of empirical support, we must now revisit Nanay’s 
challenges against content-related views of aesthetic experience. 
3.2 NANAY’S THREE CHALLENGES REVISITED 
The first objection was Conservatism:  
CONSERVATISM: If we construe AED-properties too narrowly, then it would 
be difficult to explain aesthetic experience of the everyday.  
This is a reasonable concern, but I think its threat is greatly exaggerated. Recently, 
proponents of everyday aesthetics have called attention to a whole array of 
aesthetic properties that populate our quotidian lives, such as being pretty, 
cluttered, drab, dirty, sparkled, shiny, etc.8 that have been largely neglected by 
more conservative philosophers of art (Leddy 1995, 2005, 2013; Mandoki 2007; 
Saito 2015). Notice also that a more conservative aesthetics is also at odds with 
many uncontroversial examples of contemporary artworks. This is what Danto 
drives at, when he draws attention to a work like Rauschenberg’s Bed, which 
embodies an aesthetics based on properties such as grunge and mess, rather than 
beauty (2007, pp. 123-124); but the point might be easily generalized to many 
other contemporary artworks as well (Saito 2017). 
The second challenge was Different Properties:  
DIFFERENT PROPERTIES: Suppose that at t1, a subject aesthetically experiences 
an artwork X. At t2, she aesthetically experiences the everyday Y in virtue 
of having looked at X aesthetically (AtW), but X and Y have different 
properties. 
Many contemporary artists recruit material from the everyday and turn it into 
observationally indiscernible artworks from their everyday counterparts (Danto 
1964):  
INDISCERNIBILITY: An artwork X appears identical with an everyday item Y, 
i.e. they are qualitatively indiscernible in their observable properties.  
	
8 Aesthetic properties include also negative ones, the disgusting, the obscene, etc. 
(Berleant 2010, pp. 155ff; Mandoki 2007, pp. 37ff). 
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X might be Beuys’ Filzanzug (1970) — a two-piece, coarse grey felt suit —, or 
Warhol’s Brillo Box (1964), and Y another qualitatively indistinguishable two-
piece, coarse grey felt suit, or a Brillo box. Granting that X and Y will differ in 
their, say, relational properties, and in the fact that only Xs possess the property 
of “being an artwork,” Indiscernibility shows that at least as far as observable AED-
properties are concerned, X and Y can indeed share AED-properties9. Even in less 
extreme cases, where X and Y significantly differ, and therefore do not instantiate 
exactly all the same AED-properties, there is no reason to assume that Y can’t 
instantiate AED-properties. This admits of different degrees. Products of expert 
designers — think of Sottsass’ Olivetti Valentine typewriter or Chippendale’s 
chairs —, or the creations of skilful gardeners are obvious AED-properties 
carriers. Some AED-properties, of course, might obtain by sheer chance in natural 
or artificial settings, i.e. even when they do not respond to a particular purpose. 
Ziff vividly makes this point when he said that: «[g]arbage strewn about is apt to 
be as delicately variegated in hue and value as the subtlest Monet. Discarded beer 
cans create striking cubist patterns» (quoted from Leddy 2008). Furthermore, once 
we acknowledge a broader palette of aesthetic properties, including negative ones 
like “being smelly” or “being dirty,” (think of Beuys’ Stuhl mit Fett) I see little 
cause to deny that X and Y might share AED-properties.  
The third challenge is No-Property-Change:  
NO-PROPERTY-CHANGE: Suppose that at t1, a subject experiences an 
everyday object Y. At t2, she experiences an artwork X aesthetically, and at 
t3, she experiences again the very same Y aesthetically (AtW), and none of 
Y’s relevant properties have changed between t1 and t3. 
	
9 I adopt the realist vocabulary of “sharing properties” for convenience, but I 
remain neutral about the metaphysics of such properties (i.e. whether they are 
universals, tropes, etc.). My arguments combine with multiple accounts. In 
claiming that some of such properties feature as part of perceptual content, for 
instance, I am not perforce committed to any form of objectivism construed as 
absolute mind-independence. On a more Kantian notion of objectivity, perceptual 
content results from the interplay of sensibility [Sinnlichkeit] and intellect 
[Verstand] (cf. McDowell 1996, 1998, pp. 112-130; cf. §3.3). Notice also that I am in 
no way committed to the claim that all AED-properties are observable.  
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As we have seen, this poses two challenges. I should anticipate that these 
challenges pertain to Aesthetic Alteration, and that they will be properly 
examined in §4. For now, let us observe that — in virtue of its second “attention” 
requirement — the Content View does have the same resources of Nanay’s 
attention-based account. Accordingly (first challenge), one could say that at t3 the 
subject redirects her attention (voluntarily or not) to Y’s AED-properties in virtue 
of having experienced an artwork aesthetically with similar properties. Thus, on 
these terms the aesthetic attention view does not offer an explanatory advantage 
over the Content View. Yet, it is not clear why the subject comes to notice AED-
properties at t3, and (second challenge) what is the role of X in bringing about this 
change. Before I postpone further thoughts on this to §4, however, I would like to 
pinpoint once again that in so far as both Carroll’s Content View and Nanay’s 
view defer to attention they are explanatory on a par about this specific issue. 
3.3. LOOKING AESTHETICALLY: CONTENT PLUS ATTENTION 
So far, I have casted doubt on Nanay’s aesthetic attention view, calling into 
question (i) its empirical support; and (ii) its plausibility as signature of aesthetic 
experience. Then, I have defended Carroll’s Content View on the ground that (iii) 
it squares better with the empirical evidence Nanay’s credit to support his own 
view; (iv) that it is not vulnerable to the strictures Nanay’s construes in his three 
challenges; and (v) that, as it stands, it already makes attention a necessary 
ingredient of aesthetic experience, thus having the same explanatory advantages 
of Nanay’s own view without its shortcomings. I hasten to clarify that my defence 
of Carroll’s Content View does not shield it against Goldman’s charge of 
“narrowness,” nor is it my intention to do so here10 . Perhaps, additional 
ingredients are required to turn an experience into an aesthetic one.  
Given my focus on mainly visually-accessible artworks (and everyday), we have 
enough to construct an account of Aesthetic Looking. The aesthetic literature 
contains plenty of references to an aesthetic mode of perception (e.g. Levinson 
2016, p. 39; Tomas 1959). Considered the importance of attention in shaping our 
perceptual acquaintance with artworks. We can say that, when the subject looks 
aesthetically at a given target her attention structures «her mental life so that a 
state of seeing that thing [AED-properties, in our case] is prioritized» (Watzl 2017, 
	
10 As I pointed out in §2.1, other content-related views may simply add further 
conditions, like evaluative responses, including emotional reactions. 
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p. 45; cf. also Kalderon 2018, pp. 163ff). Basing on the foregoing considerations, 
we can put forth the following: 
AESTHETIC LOOKING: A state of looking is an aesthetic one, iff:  
(a) Its content disjunctively exhibits at least some AED-properties; and 
(b) The subject attends with understanding to such properties (informed 
attention). 
The second clause (b) dictates that attention must be deployed in a way informed 
by the subject’s relevant background knowledge or understanding, i.e. in terms of 
«certain strategies and techniques of reception» (Carroll 2010, p. 104) specific to 
the category the artwork belongs to (§2.1); as shown by the experimental studies 
(§3.1)11. My account of Aesthetic Looking is easily contrasted with Nanay’s N1, for 
on his account aesthetic attention only (i.e. object-focused and property-
distributed attention) provides the aesthetic signature, whereas the Content View 
I recommend reinstates the importance of AED-properties as well. Three caveats 
are in order. 
First, my notion of aesthetic looking is target-neutral, but the reader may doubt 
the application of (b) to the everyday and in general non-art things and scenes. 
While in the case of artworks informed attention will structure the perceptual 
process as to grant «priority of processing» (Carrasco et al. 2004) to AED-
properties in conformity with the artwork’s purpose, quite often — that is, 
leaving aside products of design, gardens, etc. — quotidian things and scenes do 
not have any “purpose,” and may thus simply lack design properties. Think again 
of Ziff’s case: garbage strewn about may be as delicately variegated as a Monet, 
but of course this is likely due to sheer chance. In such a case, the subject may 
simply acknowledge the randomness of such properties, thereby guiding 
attention accordingly; or she might recruit the strategies and techniques of 
reception of some specific art-domains, transposing them to the everyday target. 
	
11 Notice that this leaves open the Kantian option that a percipient’s conceptual 
apparatus may, in some sense, be partially constitutive of one’s perceptual 
content, and thus co-constitute the AED-properties (cf. footnote 9). Also, notice 
that Carroll’s construal of understanding mandates that not just any sort of 
understanding will do (medical, physical, etc.) but it must pertain to the category 
the artwork belong to (more on this in §4).  
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One, however, may also come to appreciate the instantiation of AED-properties in 
relation to the function (if any) of the object (cf. Parsons & Carlson 2008)12.  
Second, my view might account for the gradualness of such experiences. It seems 
plausible that two experts may dwell on different aspects (AED-properties) of the 
same target, for instance because of their differing degrees of understanding of 
the relevant subject matter; in this case, they will perceptually prioritize different 
features of the target. It also allows the difference between laymen and experts to 
be one of degree, rather than kind. Recall the finding that «artistically trained 
participants view familiar objects to a lesser extent than the laymen, with an 
increased preference for viewing more or less abstract, structural features» (Vogt 
& Magnussen 2007, p. 99; my emphasis). In both cases, in light of contemporary 
vision science, it is hardly surprising that subjects with different degrees of 
expertise will tend to look at (and overlook) different features of the target 
(Schwartz 1985, p. 712). Nanay (2015a) appropriately cites studies on inattentional 
blindness as a way of comparison (e.g. Simon & Chabris 1999). Such studies 
illustrate that unattended properties or objects of a scene are either non-
consciously processed (e.g. Rensink et al. 1997) or do not gain access to systems 
responsible for cognitive broadcasting (e.g. Block 2007). We need not take a stance 
on this controversy here, it suffices to point out that attention to some feature 
enables cognitive reportability, consequently affecting aesthetic judgment and 
evaluation (Nodine 1983). 
Finally, one might object that my account only works in conjunction with some 
version of the rich content view of perceptual experience (Siegel 2010), i.e. if the 
reach of perceptual (visual) content includes not only low-level properties such as 
colors, forms, etc. but also higher level properties as well, such as “being a 
human”, “being a pine tree”, “being expressionist” etc. (Stokes 2018). The rich 
content view would square nicely with my account of Aesthetic Looking, but 
there are also alternatives. For instance, it seems relatively unproblematic to 
assume that in many cases the cognitive appraisal of AED-properties will be 
grounded in distinctive patterns of low-level perceptive properties. Hence, it 
seems plausible to say that token states of Aesthetic Looking single out the 
relevant patterns of low-level properties that enable higher-order cognitive 
categorizations. But notice also that some clearly low-level properties may well 
	
12 I thank a reviewer for pointing this out to me.  
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play the role of AED-properties, for instance, colours (as when one contemplates a 
Rothko, or a Yves Klein’s blue) and combination of forms.  
Another possible option might be to construe AED-properties in nominalistic 
terms as the application of predicates. In this sense, one might easily allow for 
certain entities or scenes to metaphorically possess AED-properties; this obtains 
when a predicate that belongs to a symbolic realm gets transferred to a different 
realm (e.g. Goodman 1976, pp. 68ff), as for instance when we apply the predicate 
“miserable” (realm: human emotions) to the figure of Picasso’s The Old Guitarist. 
There is no need to work out the details of these different options, for my 
purposes, it suffices to say that my account of Aesthetic Looking is flexible 
enough as to accommodate different options about the reach of perceptual 
content.  
4. EXEMPLIFICATION AND AESTHETIC ALTERATION 
4.1 FROM LINGERING ATTENTION TO EXEMPLIFICATION 
We now have an account of Aesthetic Looking, what we need is to examine 
Aesthetic Alteration. Nanay’s account of this problem is:  
(N2) « […] it is the aesthetic way in which we are attending to the world 
that lingers» (2018, p. 79). 
On Nanay’s account of AtW what happens is that our aesthetic attention response 
to artworks lingers on, even when we afterward come to look at the everyday, we 
still have the same aesthetic attention pattern. Since I have rejected N1, N2 
remains groundless, it is no longer clear what lingers on; hence, we need a new 
account of Aesthetic Alteration.  
A natural thing to do would be to see whether the Content View offers us some 
resources to deal with this problem. Earlier (§3.2), we have seen that the No-
Property-Change scenario bears on our issue, as it consists of two challenges: to 
explain why the subject notices AED-properties of Y at t3 and not at t1, and what is 
the role of X in bringing about this change. Neither the Content View nor Nanay’s 
aesthetic attention view have the resources to cope with this problem as they 
merely specify the “subjective side” of the relation between subject and artwork 
(or any other object), i.e. they merely specify what occurs to the subject in her 
perceptual encounter with the artwork. With this, I suggest that we should look at 
how artworks are made or embodied in order to grasp how they elicit Aesthetic 
Alteration. 
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What underpins Aesthetic Alteration is the capacity of artworks to refer to AED-
properties. This aspect may be accounted for by means of one of Goodman’s 
(1976, pp. 252ff; also 1978/1988) symptoms of the aesthetic: reference by 
displaying or exemplification. According to Goodman (1984, pp. 54ff) reference by 
exemplification exhibits an “object-to-feature” direction (Elgin 1996, p. 171; 2017, 
pp. 183ff; Goodman 1976, pp. 52ff). Think of a colour chip in a paint shop. The 
chip is a colour sample that is used to make us aware of its colour, enabling us to 
«recognize that feature when we encounter it in other contexts» (Elgin 2017, p. 
187). The feature conveyed can be a property, a set of properties, a pattern, etc. In 
general, exemplars are symbols used in specific contexts for some purpose (Elgin 
2017, p. 253).  
Goodman said that exemplification requires «possession plus reference» (1976, p. 
53; 1981). This is definitely too meagre, we need to flesh out this notion in more 
details if we want to construct an account of Aesthetic Alteration on it. I give the 
following definition, and then spell it out with reference to artworks:    
EXEMPLIFICATION: An item O (the exemplar) is a symbol that exemplifies F-ness 
in a context c where it plays an intended function f iff:  
(a) O possesses (literally or metaphorically) 13 F, and 
(b) O refers to F-ness, i.e.:  
(b.1) O embodies F in such a way as to highlight it, i.e. as to draw S’s 
informed attention to O’s being F (a); and, 
(b.2) O makes thereby S epistemically aware of F-ness.     
Exemplars are given always in some context and play a function that depends on 
someone’s intentions (as individuals or collective implicit intentions, like social 
norms). Pollock’s Number One can be taken as exemplar in an art history class or 
in an investment seminar. Accordingly, its function will vary. In the investment 
seminar, it might exemplify volatility, whereas in an art history class it may 
exemplify the paint’s viscosity (Elgin 1996, p. 175). Even within the same context 
the exemplar’s function can vary, and so the F-ness it makes reference to. A 
Tarbell may be used to exemplify the feature “being impressionistic,” or more 
specifically, the distinctive traits of American impressionism, and so on. 
	
13 Elgin takes a «tolerant approach» to properties, and recognizes a property 
«corresponding to each extension an item belongs to, regardless of whether that 
extension is semantically marked or metaphysically privileged» (2017, p. 184). 
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Possession (a) is intrinsic and can be characterized in a literal or metaphorical way 
(Elgin 2017, p. 261). Possession secures that the exemplar itself is denoted by the 
predicate or property it exemplifies. A sample of green must itself be green. But 
possession alone does not make exemplification. A colour chip possesses many 
properties, but not all of them will be exemplified. The exemplified property is 
the one the exemplar makes reference to.  
How does a symbol refer to F-ness (b)? Textor (2008) suggests that what singles 
out F as the property referentially conveyed is grounded in the symbol’s being 
intentionally used for that function. The intended function might be explicit, or 
implicit as a social convention. This proposal is largely sympathetic with 
Goodman (1972, p. 162), but I doubt that it provides a sufficient ground for 
reference. To see why, let us consider two cases:  
C1: John shows to Emily O, a colour chip, as sample of a shade of red, R. 
Although O does possess R (condition (a)), R only occupies a tiny fraction 
of O’s surface, which causes Emily to struggle to single out R. 
C2: John fetches another colour chip, O’, which is fully covered with R. 
However, O’ has a curious torus-like shape S. Basing on contextual 
information (John is a salesman at the local paint shop)14, Emily grasps 
John’s intention to display R. Yet, she struggles with O’ as well, as its S 
averts her attention from R.  
The chips in C1 and C2 are not good exemplars, they do not embody the conveyed 
features in the right manner. This suggests that, in order to refer, something more 
than mere intention is needed, something about the way the exemplar conveys F-
ness. Elgin urges (2017, pp. 191ff) that the exemplar should downplay other 
features, and highlight F. But it is not clear what “highlight” means. 
On this point, Textor (2008) claims that talk about exemplars highlighting or 
calling attention to something is absurd, for things do not call attention to 
anything, people do. He casts doubt on the very idea of an exemplar 
“highlighting” anything by appealing to Goodman’s alleged dismissal of the idea 
	
14 As Elgin (2017, p. 188ff) argues, background knowledge in cases of regimented 
or codified contexts may provide clear coordinates to individuate the conveyed 
feature, while laymen might have to guess, and perhaps might simply be unable 
to spot the feature (1996, p. 176). 
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in his reply to Beardsley’s criticism. I say “alleged,” for in that context Goodman 
does not actually use the term “highlight.” Goodman (1978, p. 172) talks about 
laying “emphasis” in terms of conspicuousness. In another passage, Goodman says 
that «[t]o exemplify is to bring out, call attention to, but not necessarily to stress a 
feature; a significant feature […] may be quite subtle […]» (Goodman & Elgin 
1988, p. 69; my emphasis). It is clear that Goodman drives a wedge between, on 
the one hand, highlighting and calling attention to something, as vehicles of 
exemplification and, on the other, emphasizing, making conspicuous, or stressing. 
The exemplified feature might be subtle and difficult to spot. Sometimes the 
prominence or conspicuousness accorded to a feature might be a consequence of 
the deliberate choice to make some other feature salient. Think of Gauguin’s Le 
Christ jaune. The painting clearly exhibits a conspicuous amount of yellow, but it 
can hardly be taken — at least in most art-related contexts — as exemplifying 
yellowness. Rather, the conspicuousness of yellow is functional to realize the 
purpose of the painting (§2.1), for instance displaying the isolated life and piety of 
the peasants. 
Elgin (2017, p. 196) says that exemplification must do more than merely call 
attention of the object’s instance of F-ness if it is to serve any role in 
understanding. Indeed, displaying F by means of O is just a means through which 
the exemplar is used to restructure the receiver’s epistemic outlook (Goodman 
1976, p. 65). In using Number One as exemplar of volatile investment, the 
instructor usually does not mean to discuss that particular instance, but to draw 
the audience’s attention to investment volatility more generally. In other words, 
the exemplar must provide epistemic access to F (b.2). 
4.2  AESTHETIC ALTERATION 
I believe that, pace Textor (2008), it is possible to make sense of things calling 
attention to some of their features, and that highlighting a feature does not need 
to be reduced to conspicuousness. It is at this juncture that this digression on  
exemplification rejoins with my earlier account of artworks as embodied 
purposes. I have given a first hint at this move when I specified that the color 
chips in C1 and C2 do not embody the feature in the right way. But we must now 
show how an exemplar might embody a feature in such a way as to refer to that 
feature, rather than merely instantiating it. 
Looking at an artwork is a complex activity that involves the interplay of several 
subjective and objective factors (e.g. Leder et al. 2004; Leder & Nadal 2014). 
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Among the former factors, the subject must be able to exercise her recognitional 
dispositions and discriminatory (perceptual) capacities in an informed way 
mandated by both the context and intended function of the exemplar, and the 
way the exemplar embodies its purpose. The latter condition does justice to the 
foregoing consideration that a good sample must embody the feature in an 
appropriate way. Such an appropriate way, as I will now suggest, in the case of 
artworks consists in providing some scaffolding for the deployment of the 
subject’s informed attention (e.g. Clark 2008; Sterelny 2010) . 
Roughly speaking, the scaffolded thesis suggests that «human cognitive capacities 
both depend on and have been transformed by environmental resources. Often 
these resources have been preserved, built or modified precisely because they 
enhance cognitive capacity» (Sterelny 2010, p. 472) (cf. also Menary 2014). In our 
specific case, my claim is that artworks scaffold our perceptual processes. In order 
to see how this  works, we should refer back to Carroll’s description of artworks 
as embodied purposes. Artworks have purposes, they sometimes convey a complex 
message, or draw our attention to some subtle feature from our quotidian lives. 
Take for example Dorothea Lange’s photograph Migrant Mother. Lopes comments 
this photograph saying that it is meant to convey the message that we ought to 
«help the poor, who are noble and do not deserve their poverty» (Lopes 2005, p. 
237). The exemplification of this feature, Lopes urges, is only possible thanks to its 
«aesthetic aspects — from its composition, its lighting, and printing to the fine 
balance it strikes between the depiction of pride and resourcefulness on the one 
hand and despair and vulnerability on the other» (ivi, p. 143). Such aspects, its 
AED-properties, are contrived in a way that is functional to the expression of its 
purpose. In order to achieve this function, the artworks provide some 
instructions, or some scaffolding for its reception. That artworks are structured in 
a way that (partially) guides the observational flow of its spectators to enable its 
function is well-known15.  
In his pioneering experimental studies on eye movements, Yarbus has shown that 
«composition is the means whereby the artist to some extent may compel the 
	
15 Notice that this point highlights a further shortcoming of Nanay’s aesthetic 
attention view, i.e. it does not take into account the structure of the artwork, and 
therefore leaves unclear why an artwork may prompt a change in attention or 
elicit any sort of effect in the subject. In this respect, my account offers a further 
explanatory advantage over Nanay’s view. 
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viewer to perceive what is portrayed in the picture» (1967, p. 193). But artists and 
art theorists (Kepes 1944/1995; Klee 1925, p. 23), art critics, and art psychologists 
have long been aware of this. The idea is that artists exploit basic visual 
phenomena that draw attention to particular regions of the targets (Wolfe 1998). 
As a way of example, consider the following passage from Kepes: 
A color spot generates different experiences of space depending upon  
whether it is placed in the middle of the picture-plane, to the left or right, 
or at the top or bottom. […] The introduction of more than one spot 
increases the sensation of space. The spots move away from or toward each 
other, receding or advancing, and seem to have weight or a centripetal or 
centrifugal direction. (Kepes 1944/1995, p. 24) 
The clever use of space and figures in this example elicits an (illusory) impression 
of movement and space that shape the percipient’s gaze drawing the percipient’s 
attention to some features of the painting. Another example comes from studies 
on the role of obliquity. Consider now Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1: Giotto, Il bacio di Giuda (1303-1305) from Cappella degli Scrovegni, 
Padova. 
Building on Arnheim’s (1954) work, Argenton (2008, p. 178ff) illustrates how the 
diagonal lines of the torches and spears that surround the figures of Christ and 
Judas direct the percipient’s gaze on the depiction of the kiss (cf. also Schapiro 
1983, pp. 37ff). These examples illustrate how artists may contrive AED-
properties in a way that contributes to the artwork’s purpose by exerting some 
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control over the beholder’s gaze. The artworks, in other words, provide some 
scaffolding for the orientation of the beholder’s attention.  
The subject needs to mobilize her cognitive capacities to fully appreciate and 
discern the exemplified feature, and this in turn depends on acknowledging the 
context and intended function of the exemplar. Within the institutionalized 
context in which artworks are embedded, a subject being shown a Simone Martini 
should deploy the cognitive strategies specified by a highly codified body of 
knowledge about Gothic art (Elgin 2017, p. 188). This places some constraints on 
what sort of understanding (§2.1) the subject must mobilize in order to appreciate 
an artwork16. 
Notice that the subject’s knowledge and expertise as they inform its attention also 
confer to the subject a degree of freedom from the artworks’ scaffolding. Koide 
and collaborators (2015) have shown that while naïve subjects’ eye-patterns are 
mainly stimulus-driven, experts’ eye-patterns seem stimulus driven only in early 
fixation. After salient stimuli have grabbed their attention, experts’ fixations seem 
less stimulus-driven and more guided by top-down factors that enable them to 
spot compositional properties of the artwork under observation17.   
From this discussion it will be clear that, if we want to find out what an artwork 
exemplifies, what F is meant to make us epistemically aware of, we must look at it 
aesthetically (§3.3). The referential capacity of exemplars lies in the complex 
dynamic of interaction they contribute to elicit through the way they are 
structured, providing some scaffolding, and the way we mobilize our informed 
attention. This vindicates Carroll’s insight (§2.1) that in cases of aesthetic 
	
16 It has been pointed out to me that the notion of exemplification employed here 
may just as well be used to describe how scientific models refer to some features. 
This is not a drawback of my analysis. Indeed, anyone familiar with Goodman’s 
and Elgin’s work on exemplification will readily acknowledge this point. Note 
that the kind of understanding (background knowledge) mobilized in 
deciphering an artwork in a given aesthetic context c will be specific to the 
category the artwork belongs to. Using Number One as exemplar of volatility in an 
investment seminar will draw on different cognitive resources. 
17 It is an interesting, but ultimately separate question whether these top-down 
cognitive factors constitute a case of cognitive penetration (e.g. Stokes 2017); my 
considerations are compatible with cognitive penetration but do not entail it.   
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experience (or aesthetic looking) the experienced content must be negotiated in 
terms of certain strategies and techniques of reception, plus of course the 
properties of the target observed. Notice also that, since the referential relation is 
dynamically defined by the interaction, it allows — in agreement with Goodman 
(1978/1988, pp. 64-65) — for change: an artwork may be devised to exemplify F-
ness, but later come to exemplify Q-ness. This is so because artworks are symbols. 
A stone encountered in our quotidian life is not an artwork and does not 
exemplify anything, but it may become an artwork if it is invested of a complex 
symbolic function. Specifying when something counts as an aesthetic symbol 
(Goodman 1978/1988, pp. 57ff)18 is a question that goes beyond the scope of the 
present investigation; for my purposes, it suffices to acknowledge that there 
indeed are such symbols. 
My claim is that Aesthetic Alteration is explained by the fact that artworks are 
symbols, and the specific interaction with such symbols demands aesthetic 
looking. Sometimes, AED-properties may just be the exemplified properties, for 
example in didactic contexts when someone takes artworks as exemplars for 
AED-properties. Some artworks may be designed for the purpose of exemplifying 
a specific aesthetic property often found in our quotidian lives. But in general, if 
artworks demand aesthetic looking qua symbols, they make us thereby better 
aware not only of the exemplified property F, but also of the AED-properties that 
are functional to its conveying F-ness, thereby facilitating our recognition of that 
feature(s) when we encounter it (or them) in other contexts, such as the everyday. 
This entails that AtW only enables us to spot the properties we have looked at 
aesthetically in artworks beforehand.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Time two wrap things up. I have claimed that we look aesthetically (direct our 
informed attention to an artwork’s AED-properties) because they are symbols 
that exemplify a certain feature. In doing so, we heighten our sensibility not only 
toward the exemplified feature but also toward the AED-properties in an artwork 
that ground the exemplification. This means being better able to recognize 
instantiations of such properties in our quotidian lives, other artworks, things and 
	
18 Discussing about how he picked up trash in the city to turn them into artworks, 
Rauschenberg said that by making them “art” «the object itself was changed by its 
context and therefore became a new thing» (Brooks 2008). 
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people. We now notice the cubist pattern in the discarded beer cans, or the 
resemblance of a face to a Botticelli’s figure. These are instances of cultivating our 
aesthetic sensibility that expand our perceptual commerce with the world and 
provide a source of «gratification» that may help experience our lives in a «more 
satisfying» way (Irivin 2008, p. 41), or better notice its negative aesthetic 
properties.  
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